The paper considers the role of industry-specific input taxes and aggregate production efficiency in economies with imperfect competition. It is first established that differentiated employment taxes can increase efficiency and the determinants of the relative rates of such taxes are investigated. The employment of an industry will be taxed at a lower rate when that industry has low returns to scale and the taxshifting effect is large. These findings are then combined with previous analysis of the taxation of final commodities and intermediate inputs. The results show that the optimal tax system will not, in general, maintain production efficiency. A characterisation of optimal input taxes based on the elasticity of input demand is derived.
INTRODUCTION
It has become a widely accepted proposition in the theory of taxation that labour should be taxed at the same rate in all forms of employment. 1 The basis for this view is the celebrated "Production Efficiency Lemma" of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) , which asserts the optimality of equalising marginal rates of substitution between firms, and the related work of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972) and Mirrlees (1972) .
Common to all these analyses is the assumption of competitive behaviour on the part of firms. In contrast, recent work has considered the consequences of extending the theory of commodity taxation to incorporate imperfectly competitive behaviour (Konishi 1990; Myles 1989a,b) . Given these new insights, it seems natural to reassess the use of employment taxes and the desirability of production efficiency in situations with imperfect competition.
Previous analyses of taxation with imperfect competition have studied the taxation of final commodities and the taxation of produced, or intermediate, inputs but have not addressed the taxation of labour inputs. Consequently, the second section of the paper analyses the effects of employment taxes with imperfect competition by way of considering three simple economies. A comparative statics analysis is conducted and it is shown that when imperfect competition is present, differentiated employment taxes can be justified by efficiency considerations. The factors that determine the relative rates of these taxes, in particular returns to scale and industrial conduct, are isolated and interpreted.
These results are then integrated into an analysis of a complete tax system for an imperfectly competitive economy and of whether production efficiency should be maintained by an optimal tax system when imperfect competition is present. The third section approaches this from a tax reform perspective and characterises the optimal direction of reform from a zero-tax initial position. This is followed by the determination of an optimal tax system. In both cases, a single-consumer economy is analysed so that no equity considerations arise and the tax structures characterised are efficient. The main message of the analysis is that commodity taxation, labour taxation and intermediate good taxation are complementary instruments in an optimal tax system for an imperfectly competitive economy. Conclusions are given in the final section.
DIFFERENTIATED EMPLOYMENT TAXES
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how differentiated employment taxes can enhance efficiency in economies characterised by imperfect competition. The basic determinants of relative tax rates are also described. These results, as well as being of interest in their own right, provide the basis for the analysis of a comprehensive tax system in the following sections.
The effects of differentiated employment taxes are studied in three economies of approximately increasing generality. In each it is assumed that the revenue requirement is zero, so that only efficiency aspects of taxation are involved, and that utility is additive in labour supply so that income effects can be ignored. The details of the derivations will mostly be omitted since they involve the application of standard comparative statics techniques.
With regard to the incidence of employment taxes, there are two valid representations. The first is to fix the wage rate received by workers at the level w.
Firm j in industry i with output x i j facing a tax on its labour input of τ i per unit then has cost function
where w + τ i is the post-tax cost per unit of labour. The alternative representation is to assume the worker pays the tax and maximises utility with respect to a wage rate w i -τ i, with a firm j in industry i having costs
It is probably evident that these representations actually describe identical economies.
That this is indeed the case can be seen by noting that competition on the labour market must result in the returns across firms being equalised. Hence w i -τ i = w or w i = w + τ i. From this equality the two methods of modelling the economy are equivalent and the real equilibrium is independent of the notional incidence of the tax.
The class of taxes under consideration can therefore be viewed as either taxes upon labour income or as taxes on labour inputs. It is the latter interpretation that is adopted below. In addition, the tax will be assumed to be paid by the firms and consequently the wage received by consumers will be normalised at the fixed value w.
It can also be shown that the real equilibrium is also unaffected by the choice of value for w. 2
In the first economy, let industry 1 be competitive, employing 1 unit of labour to produce each unit of output. Hence its post-tax price, q 1 , is equal to marginal cost inclusive of taxation and is given by
Industry 2 is composed of a profit maximising monopolist who faces the demand function X 2 = X 2 q 2 .
[4]
and has costs
Since [4] is independent of the level of profits, it embodies the assumption that all income effects fall on labour supply. This is a simplifying assumption that does not alter the qualitative properties of the results derived. The analysis of Myles (1989b) shows how it can be relaxed but at the price of increased algebraic complexity. The restriction to the pair of tax instruments focuses attention on the role of input taxes and permits the characterisation of the optimal values. Although a tax on the output of the monopolist would also be of interest in this framework, the inclusion of further tax instruments is postponed until later in the paper.
From the monopolist's first-order condition for profit maximisation it can be calculated that the effect of the employment tax upon price is given by
where C 0 2 and C 1 2 are the derivatives of [5] with respect to its first and second arguments. The effect of the tax upon profit is 2 For economies with imperfect competition this result is proved in Cripps and Myles (1989) .
Writing !! " i for the labour demand of industry i, the government budget constraint is
Finally, social welfare is determined by the indirect utility function
[9]
Maximising [9] with respect to τ 1 and τ 2 subject to [8] and solving the resulting necessary conditions, the optimal value of τ 2 can be characterised implicitly by
[10]
Since ∂" i ∂τ i < 0 for i = 1, 2, the denominator in [10] is positive and the sign of τ 2 is determined by that of the numerator. Noting that ! " 1 = X 1 , ! " 2 = C 1 2 and that [9] implies the marginal utility of income is unity, by using Roy's identity and [7] the numerator of [10] can be written
where the direction of the inequality follows from [6] . Therefore, in this economy, the labour input to the monopolist should be subsidised and that to the competitive firm should be taxed.
The inequality in [11] demonstrates that differentiated employment taxes can be justified on efficiency grounds in an imperfectly competitive economy since if τ 2 < 0 then, in order to satisfy the budget constraint, τ 1 > 0. The sign of the optimal tax in [11] is in accordance with the standard partial equilibrium conclusion that the output from the monopolist should be increased. However, it must be noted that [11] was derived in a general equilibrium context and that the subsidy to the monopolist is financed by a tax on the labour input of a competitive industry. That the monopolist should always be subsidised is, perhaps, surprising. It should also be stressed that since the employment taxes are non-uniform they are not equivalent to an income tax nor to a uniform commodity tax structure.
The second economy is designed to provide insight into the determinants of relative rates of tax on labour employed by two distinct imperfectly competitive industries. Hence let both industries 1 and 2 be monopolistic 3 with demands X 1 = X 1 q 1 ( ) and X 2 = X 2 q 2 ( ). Repeating the maximisation of welfare, with indirect utility now equal to V q 1 ,q 2 ( )+ π 1 + π 2 , the solution for τ 2 can be written implicitly as
The denominator of [12] is positive so the sign of τ 2 is again determined by that of the numerator. Substituting from Roy's identity and using the fact that
numerator can be written
Using the definitions of the tax-shifting terms 4 , and dividing across by the first derivatives of the cost functions, the sign of [13] is given by the sign of
To interpret [14] , note that
i is a measure of returns to scale:
represents decreasing returns to scale, a value of 1 constant returns and < 1 increasing returns. Now assume that the two bracketed terms, which can be said to capture "market conditions", are equal. It then follows that if
3 The use of "monopolist" is justified here due to the separable demands.
then τ 2 > 0. That is, the firm with lower returns to scale should have its labour input subsidised when the market conditions are identical. This is a reflection of the fact that this firm will be proportionately further from the competitive output level. In contrast, if the returns to scale are the same for both firms, the bracketed terms describe the rate at which the firms would forward-shift any commodity tax, a response determined by the demand function it faces. Hence the firm that would forward-shift most should have the labour input subsidised. In this case, if C 00 i = 0 , then τ 2 > 0 if the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function, given by Seade's "E" (see Seade 1985 and Myles 1995) , facing firm 1 is greater than the elasticity of that facing firm 2.
From the analysis above, it can be seen how relative taxes are determined by a composition of market demand and returns to scale properties. The role of these can be understood by viewing the aim of the taxes as the achievement of a more balanced exploitation of returns to scale but the cost of this process is the consequent change in market prices, with the rate of change of prices being dependent upon the demand elasticity facing the firm. It is the resolution of these two effects that is captured in
The final economy comprises two oligopolistic industries and allows for differences in both the size, in terms of the number of firms, and the conduct of the industries. The firms comprising each industry are assumed to compete by choosing quantities of an homogeneous product. To introduce differences of conduct, it is assumed that each firm conjectures how aggregate output will change in response to a change in their output. As the industries are taken to be symmetric, all firms in each industry have the same conjecture. The conjecture is denoted by λ i, i = 1, 2. A value of λ i = 0 represents "Bertrand" competition and λ i = 1 "Cournot" competition.
With n i firms in industry i and x i j denoting the output of firm j in industry i, the inverse demand functions are defined as
From the conditions for profit maximisation, it follows that
and
where x i is the output of each firm at the symmetric equilibrium and C i ( . ) is the cost function common to all firms in industry i.
The optimal value of τ 2 will again be characterised by [12] . Assuming the denominator to be positive, substitution from [17] and [18] allows the numerator to be written as
From [19] it is possible to describe the result in a number of limiting cases. Firstly, it illustrates that with marginal cost pricing in both industries the employment taxes will both be zero, which is equivalent to the standard result for competitive economies, and that if one industry practices marginal cost pricing, the labour input for the other, assuming price is above cost, should be subsidised. Secondly, provided the derivatives are bounded, as the number of firms in both industries increases the taxes will both tend to zero.
Using the first-order condition for profit maximisation of the individual firms,
[19] can be usefully re-written as
If competition is Bertrand in both industries ( λ i = 0, i = 1,2) the taxes will both be zero; in other cases, with demands and costs equal, the industry with the larger value of λ i will be subsidised. Finally, as n 1 tends to infinity, the labour input for industry 2 should be subsidised and vice versa.
This completes the consideration of the example economies. The fact that differential employment taxes can increase welfare in an imperfectly competitive economy has been established and several factors have emerged as relevant to the determination of relative rates of tax. Amongst these factors are the returns to scale of the industries' production processes, the form of the demand function facing the industry as captured by Seade's E, the conduct of each industry and the size of the industry in terms of the number of firms. This latter factor is representative of a notion of the competitiveness of the industry.
TAX REFORM AND PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY
A fundamental result in the theory of taxation for competitive economies is that the optimal tax structure should be designed so that production efficiency is attained, which that the marginal rate of substitution between any two inputs is the same for all firms. In the absence of taxation, such a position is achieved by the profit maximising behaviour of firms in competitive markets. When taxation is introduced, profit maximisation will still lead to productive efficiency provided that all firms face identical post-tax prices for inputs so that input taxes should not be differentiated between firms. Furthermore, the observation that any equilibrium set of consumer prices and level of government revenue that can be achieved by combining input taxes and final goods taxes can also be achieved by taxes on final goods alone renders the use of input taxes redundant.
For economies with imperfect competition, the role of production efficiency has only been partially investigated. Myles (1989a) considers optimal commodity taxation but in an economy where labour is the only input so that, as in the analysis of the previous section, production inefficiency can never arise. Myles (1989b) and Konishi (1990) both consider the taxation of intermediate goods but do not treat the taxation of labour inputs. The analysis above has, however, shown that the differentiated taxation of labour is also likely to be desirable.
It is the purpose of this section to demonstrate that since it will, in general, be desirable to differentiate input taxes between firms, production efficiency will be violated. To simplify the presentation and to sharpen the results, the economy studied will be restricted to one with two monopolistic firms each employing labour and an There is nothing essential in any of the restrictions and the results that are derived will hold true in more general settings. This section will employ the approach to characterisation of the tax structure adopted in the literature on tax reform (especially Dixit (1979) and Kanbur and Myles (1992) ) which is to maximise the increase in welfare that can be attained whilst restricting the tax changes to be "small". The value of this approach is that it yields simple formula for the direction in which tax reform should proceed. In addition, since it can also be interpreted as being the first step in an iterative procedure to find the optimal taxes, it also indicates the sign pattern that the optimal taxes will take.
The derivation of optimal taxes will be presented in the following section.
The structure of the economy is as follows. Firm 0 (or, equivalently, an industry of identical small firms) employs labour to produce an intermediate good and acts competitively on all markets. Units of measurement are chosen so that its production technology requires one unit of labour for each unit of produced good; the price of its output is therefore q 0 = w + τ 0 where τ 0 is the taxed paid on each unit of labour input 5 . The wage rate is again normalised at w. 
[21]
From [21] it can be seen immediately that the simplification τ 0 = 0 can be adopted without introducing any restriction. Maximisation by firms 1 and 2 will result in optimal prices and profit levels that are functions of the tax rates. These are denoted by
To maintain the focus upon efficiency, the consumption side of the economy consists of a single consumer whose preferences can be represented by the indirect utility function V q 1 ,q 2
The characterisation of optimal taxes via welfare-maximising reform involves choosing the direction of tax change to maximise the increase in welfare that can be obtained whilst restricting the tax changes to be small. The simplifying aspect of this approach is that the restriction to small changes allows the problem to be linearised by using the gradient vectors of the functions involved. 
where all derivatives are evaluated at pre-tax prices. Condition (i) ensures that the taxes introduced raise zero revenue and (ii) that the sum of squares of the tax changes is 1. The interpretation of this condition is that units have been chosen such that 1 is small. This choice of restriction is inconsequential and the algebra is only slightly modified by choosing a number other than 1.
Introducing multipliers λ and µ for the two constraints, the first-order condition for the choice of dT i is
[22]
Multiplying [22] by Z i , summing over i and using (i) gives
Similarly, multiplying [22] by dT i , and summing gives
It is assumed that welfare can be raised by some combination of the tax instruments chosen so that µ > 0 . Using [22] , [23] and [24] , the solution for dT i can then be
Employing Roy's identity and the envelope theorem
[26]
Therefore
where
The expression S is composed of the sum of rates of tax shifting multiplied by the quantity of the taxed good weighted by the levels of final demand. S will be large if the price of either firm is particularly sensitive to tax increases.
As zero revenue is to be raised, any move from the initial position must make some taxes positive and others negative. Since µ > 0 , it follows from [25] that sgn dT i
For instance, the commodity tax on good 1 will become positive if
∂q 1 ∂t 1 > 0 and the labour tax positive if
Since S is effectively an average of shifting terms, it can be seen from these expressions that the tax will tend to become positive when its shifting effect is less than average and will be negative when it is greater than average.
Similar conclusions hold for the other tax rates.
The main focus here, though, is upon whether the reform will lead to input taxes that are differentiated between the firms. Returning to [25] , the tax reform will move towards differentiated employment taxes if
[29]
Using [27], inequality [29] reduces to
Following the same derivation, the intermediate input taxes will be differentiated if
By inspection it is clear that [30] and [31] will generally be satisfied and that the tax reform will lead to the differentiation of input taxes between firms.
However situations do exist in which [30] and [31] will not be satisfied and production efficiency will be maintained. The most obvious case occurs when !! " 1 = " 2 and X 2 ∂q 2 ∂t 2 = X 1 ∂q 1 ∂t 1 , for which X 1 q 1
but not necessary, conditions. To identify a more relevant case of non-differentiation, assume that both firms produce with constant returns to scale so that
and C 02 i = y i X i . Using these identities and the derivatives given in fn. 7, in the case of constant returns [30] reduces to
and an analogous expression, with y j replacing ! " j , holds for [31] . Hence nondifferentiation occurs with constant returns when the effect of the final good taxes on price are equal. For instance, with linear demand ∂q i ∂t i = 1 2 so that linear demand and constant returns imply that production efficiency should be maintained. This result also gives an alternative insight into why production efficiency should be maintained in a competitive economy with constant returns since, in such an environment,
Despite these special cases, the general conclusion remains that the employment tax and the intermediate goods tax will be differentiated between the firms. To confirm that such differentiation implies that production efficiency will not be achieved, it also needs to be shown that the reform will be such that the ratio of The finding of production inefficiency above is of a different nature to the temporary production inefficiency that arises along the reform paths in Dixit (1979) and Fogelman, Quinzii and Guesnerie (1978) . The analysis here has shown that the tax rates themselves will diverge at the initial stage of the reform. If the reform problem is sufficiently monotonic a continuation of the reform process would witness tax rate changes continuing in the direction they adopted at the start of the reform.
This would inevitably lead to production inefficiency at the optimum. In contrast, the temporary production inefficiency arises as the result of the shortest path between points on the frontier of the production set passing through its interior.
OPTIMAL TAXATION
Although the results of the analysis of the reform problem are indicative of the structure of optimal taxes, they do not provide a complete characterisation. The contention that production inefficiency will remain at the optimum is now examined by determining the optimal tax rates directly. From the results obtained, it will be argued that employment taxes and intermediate input taxes will in general be differentiated between firms.
The optimisation problem now under consideration is given by
subject to
Condition (i) states the dependence of price and profits levels upon the tax rates and (ii) is the zero-revenue budget constraint. The requirement of zero revenue implies that divergence of the optimal taxes from zero will occur only in order to increase efficiency.
The first-order conditions for the maximisation can be arranged to give the following (implicit) solution for the tax rates
and λ is the multiplier on the revenue constraint.
The structure of [34] shows immediately why production efficiency does not apply. Since the demand for each good is assumed to depend only upon the price of that good, the two industries are effectively separate. The structure of taxation is then chosen to control each industry individually with the Lagrange multiplier providing the link between the two. As the industries are controlled separately, there is no reason to expect any particular link between the input taxes levied on one and those levied on the other. The total separability is, of course, a reflection of the structure of demand chosen for the example and was selected to emphasise the point to be made.
However, production efficiency cannot be a general property of the optimal tax system since it does not hold for this example. Under alternative assumptions, the separability would be lost but there would remain no uniform relation between the input taxes.
To investigate the factors that determine the structure of the taxes it is best to write the first-order conditions for the optimisation in a different form. For the choice of τ i the necessary condition can be written, using Roy's identity and the envelope property of the profit function, as
For small taxes, the numerator of the left-hand side of [40] [41]
Eq.
[41] reinforces how the relative optimal tax rates are determined by the elasticities of input demand and, since the ratio for each firm is determined by the properties of that firm's cost function, the ratios for the two firms will be independent.
This section has considered the structure of optimal taxation of both outputs and inputs. Characterisations of optimal taxes have been given and it is clear from these that production efficiency will not in general be maintained at the optimum.
Although the analysis was conducted for a simplified economy it can be extended but at the expense of cumbersome notation.
CONCLUSIONS
The paper has considered the role of industry-specific input taxes in models of optimal taxation. In competitive economies, it follows from the Diamond-Mirrlees Production Efficiency lemma that such taxes are not efficient. With imperfect competition it was established, via the analysis of three simple economies, that differential employment taxes could be justified by efficiency considerations. In addition, the economies that were studied illustrated the determinants of the relative rates of taxation. The labour input into an industry will generally be taxed at a lower rate when the industry has low returns to scale and equilibrium price increases markedly in response to the tax. The second of these factors can be broken down further to distinguish between the consequences of the shape of the demand curve facing the industry (summarised by Seade's E), the conduct of the industry in terms of conjectures and its competitiveness measured, approximately, by the number of firms in the industry.
These results were then integrated with the taxation of final commodities and produced inputs. A complete commodity tax system for an imperfectly competitive economy must consist of taxes on all final goods and labour; with the results of this paper suggesting that the input taxes should be industry specific. Labour and commodity taxes are therefore complementary in the optimal tax system. The analysis of the tax reform problem and the characterisation of optimal taxes demonstrated that production efficiency will not be desirable with imperfect competition.
